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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The landscape in American voting has changed dramatically in the 
years since the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, culminating in the 
election of the nation’s first African-American President last year. 
Despite these advances, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) and 
its subsequent reauthorizations and amendments impose strict 
requirements on how elections may be carried out in parts of the 
country with a history of racial discrimination in voting.1 In particular, 
Section 5 of the VRA prohibits jurisdictions covered by the Act from 
making any changes in their election laws without approval from the 
Justice Department or the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia.2 A change can be pre-cleared only if one of 
these entities determines that it “neither has the purpose nor will 
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of 
race or color.”3 Simultaneously, in order to address the potential 
problems of overinclusiveness that could result from Section 5’s 
coverage, Section 4(a) of the VRA allows the covered jurisdictions to 
bail-out from these requirements if they meet certain conditions.4 
 
 * 2009 LL.M. candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-l (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)). 
 2. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (outlining the procedure for changes in the election 
process in covered jurisdictions). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (allowing jurisdictions to earn exemption from coverage by 
satisfying a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
that, in the previous ten years, they have not used a test or device “for the purpose or with the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color”). 
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Congress has reauthorized and amended the VRA several times 
following its original enactment in 1965—most recently in 2006, when 
it was extended for another twenty-five years.5 A mere eight days 
after its 2006 renewal, however, Sections 4(a) and 5 were challenged 
by the Petitioner, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District 
Number One (“the District”).6 On May 30, 2008, a three-judge panel 
of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
rejected both the Petitioner’s request to bail-out from Section 5 
coverage and its challenge to the constitutionality of Sections 4(a) and 
5.7 
II.  FACTS 
The District is a local government entity created in the late-1980s 
to facilitate the development of a residential subdivision.8 It is wholly 
within the boundaries of both Travis County and the City of Austin,9 
but is not subject to the control of either.10 The District, however, has 
contracted with Travis County to administer its elections.11 After the 
2006 reauthorization of the VRA continued election coverage over 
the District, the District filed suit arguing both that it had a statutory 
right to bail-out from Section 5 coverage and, alternatively, that 
Section 5 is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power.12 This 
second, broader challenge is based on the District’s assertion that 
when Congress extended Section 5’s coverage provisions in 2006, it 
lacked sufficient evidence of racial discrimination to justify the 
continued voting restrictions in jurisdictions where it had been a 
problem but may no longer be one.13 
 
 5. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-l. 
 6. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey (Northwest Austin), 573 F. Supp. 2d 
221 (D.D.C. 2008), argued sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, No. 08-322 
(U.S., Apr. 19, 2009), 2009 WL 1146055 (the case’s name was changed due to Attorney General 
Holder replacing Attorney General Mukasey as U.S. Attorney General). 
 7. Id. at 223–24. 
 8. Id. at 229–30. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.; Brief for Appellee Travis County at 6, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. 
Holder, No. 08-322 (U.S., Mar. 18, 2009), 2009 WL 740766. 
 13. Northwest Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 223. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress originally provided in Section 4(b) that the requirements 
of Sections 4(a) and 5 would apply to any state or political subdivision 
that both: (1) according to the Attorney-General, maintained a test or 
device [for voting registration] on November 1, 1964; and (2) 
according to the Director of the Census, had registration or turnout 
rates below 50% of the voting age population on November 1, 1964.14 
Originally, Section 4(b) did not cover the State of Texas.15 The 1975 
amendments to the VRA, however, expanded the definition of “test 
or device” to include jurisdictions that provided voting materials only 
in English and where more than 5% of voting-age citizens belonged 
to a single language minority.16 Consequently, the statute covered 
Texas.17 
The District’s challenge is not the first challenge to the VRA. 
Shortly after it was originally passed, South Carolina—which the 
VRA provisions covered in its entirety—challenged the 
constitutionality of the preclearance requirement.18 The United States 
Supreme Court rejected South Carolina’s arguments, holding that 
Congress had properly exercised its enforcement powers under the 
Fifteenth Amendment because Congress may use “any rational means 
to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in 
voting.”19  
Congress subsequently reauthorized Sections 4 and 5 several 
times over the past few decades.20 Each subsequent reauthorization 
has likewise been challenged; each time unsuccessfully.21 Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder represents the 
 
 14. 1965 Act § 4(b), 79 Stat. at 438 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)). 
 15. See generally id. (limiting the geographic jurisdiction of the Voting Rights Act). 
 16. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(f)(3) (expanding the Voting Rights Act’s reach to jurisdictions 
that only provided voting materials in English and that had significant numbers of non-English-
speaking citizens). 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973d, 1973k (expanding coverage to incorporate jurisdictions 
including Texas). 
 18. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966). 
 19. Id. at 324, 327. 
 20. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey (Northwest Austin), 573 F. Supp. 
2d 221, 226–27 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing the reauthorizations of the Voting Rights Act). 
 21. See Brief for the Federal Appellee at 15, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. 
Holder, No. 08-322 (U.S., Mar. 18, 2009), 2009 WL 819480 (“Beginning in South Carolina [v. 
Katzenbach], this Court has upheld the constitutionality of the VRA on four separate 
occasions.”). 
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latest challenge to Congress’s enforcement of the VRA under its 
Reconstruction Amendments powers. 
IV.  HOLDING 
The district court rejected the District’s claims on two grounds. 
First, the court held that the District was ineligible to seek a 
declaratory judgment exempting it from Section 5 because it did not 
qualify as a “political subdivision” as defined in the VRA.22 Second, 
the court, applying the rational basis standard set forth in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach23—that government action need only 
represent a reasonable means of pursuing a legitimate governmental 
interest—found that Congress’s decision to extend Section 5 for an 
additional twenty-five years was rational. Section 5 was therefore held 
to be constitutional, given the extensive legislative record 
documenting continued racial discrimination in covered districts.24 The 
district court also concluded in the alternative that, even if the 
extension of Section 5 was controlled by the stricter standard laid 
down in City of Boerne v. Flores25—that the government must show 
that the remedial legislation is sufficiently connected to remedying a 
constitutional violation—Section 5 passed muster. Section 5’s tailored 
and remedial scheme meant that the extension qualified as a 
“congruent and proportional” response to the continued problem of 
racial discrimination in voting in the covered districts.26 
V.  ANALYSIS 
A. Is the Municipality Eligible for Bail-out As a “Political 
Subdivision”? 
The District argues that it satisfies the requirements for bail-out 
under the plain meaning of Section 4(a), which states that “any 
political subdivision of” any covered State may seek a bail-out 
 
 22. Northwest Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 223. 
 23. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (holding that the 
Voting Rights Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the enforcement clause of the 
Fifteenth Amendment). 
 24. Northwest Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 223–24. 
 25. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (holding that the Religious 
Freedom and Restoration Act was not a congruent and proportional response to the protection 
of substantive rights). 
 26. Northwest Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 223–24. 
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declaration.27 Because the District is considered a political subdivision 
under Texas law, it should likewise qualify as a political subdivision 
under the VRA.28 Given that the Court should “give the words of a 
statute their ‘ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ absent an 
indication Congress intended them to bear some different import[,]”29 
and that Congress has expressed no contrary meaning, the District 
contends that it should be covered by the bail-out procedure.30 The 
Federal Government, however, argues that the District is seeking an 
expansion of the bail-out provision “that the statutory text will not 
bear” and that the district court was correct in rejecting the District’s 
interpretation of the statute.31 
Originally, only two categories of jurisdictions were eligible to 
seek bail-out under Section 4(a): (1) designated States and (2) 
“political subdivision[s]” separately designated for coverage even if 
the state was not.32 The District acknowledges that, under these 
original bail-out criteria, it does not qualify for bail-out.33 But the 
District contends that the 1982 Amendments to the VRA govern the 
current situation because Congress added a third type of jurisdiction 
eligible for bail-out: “any political subdivision of [a covered] State . . . 
though such determinations were not made with respect to such 
subdivisions as a separate unit.”34 The Federal Government responds 
that the District cannot rely on this provision, as it was designed only 
to apply to subdivisions defined in Section 14(c)(2).35 As the District 
does not conduct voter registration itself, the district court found, and 
the Federal Government urges the Court to affirm, that the District 
cannot fall into this third category.36 
Finally, the practical effect of interpreting the statute against the 
District makes it effectively impossible for it ever to secure bail-out: 
 
 27. Id. at 230; 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1). 
 28. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 59(a), (b) (holding that the District would qualify as a 
“political subdivision”). 
 29. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000). 
 30. Brief for the Appellant at 17, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, No. 08-
322 (U.S., Feb. 19, 2009), 2009 WL 453246. 
 31. Brief for the Federal Appellee, supra note 21, at 7. 
 32. VRA § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(a)(1) (Supp. I 1965)). 
 33. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, No. 08-322 
(U.S., Dec. 9, 2008), 2008 WL 5195625. 
 34. VRA § 2(b)(2), 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)). 
 35. VRA § 14(c)(2) defines “political subdivision” as “any county or parish” that “conducts 
registration for voting” when the county does not (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2)). 
 36. Brief for Federal Appellee, supra note 21, at 10. 
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“In most covered States, including Texas, restricting [bail-out] to the 
county level makes the bailout procedure practically unworkable. For 
example, the territory of Travis County, in which the district is located, 
includes at least 107 geographically smaller government units.”37 
B. What Standard of Review Should Apply If the District Is Eligible 
to Bail-Out? 
The issue that will have more far-reaching implications is whether 
Section 5’s restrictions pass constitutional muster under Congress’s 
power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments.38 The Supreme 
Court has articulated two distinct standards for evaluating the 
constitutionality of laws enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments 
depending on which amendment is implicated: (1) a “congruence and 
proportionality” test for legislation enacted pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) a less demanding rational basis test 
for effectuating the prohibition of racial discrimination in voting 
under the Fifteenth Amendment.39 The first issue, then, is what 
standard the VRA should be judged under: the rational basis 
standard, as set forth in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, or the 
congruence and proportionality test, as laid out in City of Boerne v. 
Flores. 
The District contends that the “original emergency [that prompted 
the restrictions] has now passed,”40 and that it can demonstrate a 
continued history of respect for voting rights and therefore present a 
compelling case that the burdens imposed upon it should be 
removed.41 The District argues that the Court’s 1997 decision in City 
of Boerne, which held that Congress’s remedial powers under the 
Reconstruction Amendments must pass a congruence and 
proportionality test, makes its challenge ripe for success.42 
Moreover, the District questions Congress’s reliance on decades-
old data in renewing Section 5 in 2006 in order to show the 
reauthorization did not represent a congruent and proportional 
 
 37. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 24. 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; id. amend. XV. 
 39. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey (Northwest Austin), 573 F. Supp. 
2d 221, 235–36 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) & South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)) (discussing Congress’s ability to enforce the 
Reconstruction Amendments). 
 40. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 2. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 32–33. 
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exercise of Congress’s enforcement powers under the Reconstruction 
Amendments.43 The District argues that “[a] workable [bail-out] 
process is the only possible way of removing compliant jurisdictions 
from § 5’s overbroad coverage.”44 It must be questioned whether 
Section 5 is a valid exercise of the enforcement power, given that “[i]f 
bailout is indeed unavailable to jurisdictions like the [D]istrict, it is of 
no practical use for correcting Congress’s reliance on obsolete data 
and restraining § 5’s reach.”45 
Moreover, the District argues that: 
[p]rophylactic legislation enacted to enforce the substantive 
guarantees of the Reconstruction Amendments must be clearly 
related to remedying violations of those guarantees. And the more 
a prophylactic measure intrudes on the scope of other 
constitutional provisions and principles, the more critical it is that 
the measure fit as closely as possible to a valid remedial 
objective.46  
This lack of congruence and proportionality, given the absence of 
discrimination in Travis County over the past decade, is favorable to 
the District. It can point to the fact that the conditions that justified 
Section 5 in 1965 are not the same as those in 2006, so Congress’s 
actions do not meet the City of Boerne standard. Section 5 coverage 
cannot be justified as being a congruent and proportional response to 
discrimination where such discrimination does not exist. Furthermore, 
the original enactment of Section 5 was initially “confined to those 
regions of the country where voting discrimination had been most 
flagrant,”47 but the District’s electoral landscape in 2006 was very 
different from the original conditions that prompted the VRA, thus 
giving weight to the argument that continued coverage is excessive.48 
The District elaborates on the now antiquated nature of the 
continued preclearance requirements: “Section 5 today imposes a 
scarlet letter on residents of covered jurisdictions based on acts of 
their grandparents or—given our mobile society—other people’s 
grandparents.”49 Furthermore, the District asserts that § 5 “cannot be 
 
 43. Id. at 23. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 60. 
 46. Id. at 30. 
 47. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–33 (1997). 
 48. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 57. 
 49. Id. at 58. 
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justified simply on a record of discrimination in general. Instead, there 
must be a showing . . . of a systematic pattern of covered jurisdictions 
recently engaging in concerted efforts to game the system to the 
disadvantage of minorities by acting preemptively to impose new 
barriers to voting.”50 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder 
also raises federalism concerns. Section 5 goes beyond addressing 
discrimination and preempts all changes to voting procedures in 
covered jurisdictions, risking the balance of state and federal power, 
and representing “the most severe intrusion on state sovereignty in 
federal law.”51 Put simply, when Congress extended the VRA in 2006, 
did it have sufficient evidence of racial discrimination in voting to 
justify its intrusion upon state sovereignty? For Congress to justify 
such an intrusion, there must be “a clear demonstration that it 
remains a needed and justifiable emergency remedy, separate and 
distinct from the general justification for the VRA’s core substantive 
provisions.”52 
The Federal Government rebuts the District’s argument simply by 
stating that even if Section 5 is judged under the congruent and 
proportional standard set forth in City of Boerne—and not the more 
deferential rational basis test—it still fails: “Even when applying the 
congruence-and-proportionality standard, the Court has never 
invalidated a statute securing rights that the Court’s decisions 
recognize as entitled to heightened protection.”53 Protection of the 
rights of racial minorities to vote is at the very top of this heightened 
protection. While the Court is traditionally deferential to 
Congressional findings, it will be interesting to see just how 
deferential the Roberts Court will be to findings that do not directly 
implicate the District in racial discrimination in voting. 
VI.  ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION 
Ultimately, there remains a possibility that the Supreme Court will 
reach an anti-climatic decision and not even address the bigger 
 
 50. Id. at 40. 
 51. Id. at 42. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Brief for the Federal Appellee, supra note 21, at 25 (citing Nevada Dep’t of Human 
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003)) (recognizing that the Court has upheld the family leave 
provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 under the congruence-and-
proportionality standard). 
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question concerning the constitutionality of Section 5. If the Court 
accepts the first part of the District’s claim—that it is a “political 
subdivision” that is eligible to bail-out—then the constitutional 
question may become moot as the case would be resolved by 
permitting the District to bail-out. 
A. Strengths and Weaknesses of the District’s Case 
“In upholding the original § 5 as a provision with a five-year 
lifespan, South Carolina v. Katzenbach characterized it as a response 
to an acute emergency.”54 Consequently, the District argues that 
“Congress cannot indefinitely continue exercising extraordinary 
powers in response to an emergency with no showing the emergency 
persists.”55 This consideration is likely to carry considerable weight if 
the Respondents cannot convince the Court that the evidence of 
continued racial discrimination in voting is compelling enough that 
only Section 5’s broad approach will suffice. The considerable 
weakness in the District’s case, however, is that considerable 
Congressional findings were presented when the VRA was 
reauthorized in 2006 (discussed below). 
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Respondents’ Case 
Congress is afforded a great deal of latitude when enforcing the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments: “This Court . . . has 
repeatedly reaffirmed that Congress is ‘entitled to much deference’ in 
‘determin[ing] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the 
guarantees’ of the Reconstruction Amendments.”56 As such, the 
Respondents appear to be in a strong position to ask the Court to 
defer to Congress in this area, especially given that “deference to 
Congress is highest when it enforces the core protections of the 
Reconstruction Amendments.”57 Congress has repeatedly attempted 
to remedy racial discrimination in voting; the fact that it did so as 
recently as 2006 weighs in favor of Respondents’ argument that there 
remains a continued need for federal preclearance requirements. 
Moreover, given that racial discrimination in voting has been reduced 
considerably since the passage of the VRA, the Court might be 
 
 54. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 61. 
 55. Id. at 61–62. 
 56. Brief for Federal Appellee, supra note 21, at 18 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 536 (1997)). 
 57. Id. at 19. 
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inclined to see the VRA as a powerful force that does more good than 
it does harm, and should therefore be left in place. 
At the same time, the Court’s congruence and proportionality test 
in City of Boerne v. Flores leaves the Respondents open to attack on 
grounds that there no longer remains a continuing need for Section 5 
in light of the progress made in eliminating racial discrimination in 
voting. If the Court sees the case as primarily being under the 
Fifteenth Amendment (as the district court did), then it should be 
relatively easy for the Respondents to satisfy the lower standard of 
the “any rational means” test. Alternatively, if the Court is more 
inclined to see it as a Fourteenth Amendment case, the Respondents 
will face a more difficult task in showing that the VRA is congruent 
and proportional in light of the lack of evidence of racial 
discrimination in elections in the District. 
Finally, Travis County claims that the District experiences only 
“trivial” burdens from Section 5’s coverage, pointing to the fact that in 
the two decades of the District’s existence it has only conducted one 
contested election.58 Given the limited experience of the District in 
conducting elections, the District could be found to be “institutionally 
inexperienced with the benefits that [Section] 5 coverage brings.”59 
Establishing that Section 5 actually imposes a burden on the District 
could therefore weaken the District’s argument. It will likely have to 
satisfy the Court that, in contrast to Travis County’s assertion, there is 
a practical reason to extend the bail-out option to it if the Court 
decides that Section 5 is not an unconstitutional use of Congress’s 
remedial powers under the Reconstruction Amendments. 
Unlike the District, Travis County asserts that “racial 
discrimination in voting is not a thing of bygone days and 
generations[,]”60 which receives support from the Congressional 
findings for the 2006 reauthorization.61 This may not be a guaranteed 
victory for the Respondents, however, given that no discrimination 
was found in the District itself. Although Travis County mentions the 
continued prevalence of racial discrimination, it does not provide any 
evidence of racial discrimination in voting occurring either within the 
District or Travis County. Instead, Respondent Travis County relies on 
 
 58. Brief for Appellee Travis County, supra note 12, at 8. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 9. 
 61. See Brief for Federal Appellee, supra note 21, at 41 (discussing Congressional findings 
in reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act). 
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simplistic generalizations, such as: “There remain solid reasons to 
keep . . . [Section] 5 on the statute books.”62 The Court is likely to 
demand more in the way of firm evidence than these generalizations, 
especially if it employs the congruence and proportionality test. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Given the relatively new composition of the Roberts Court, the 
decision in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. 
Holder is eagerly awaited, not just by those who oppose Section 5’s 
continued application but also by those who believe Section 5 is 
essential to the continued protection of minorities. This case will also 
serve as an indicator of how the Court will treat future Congressional 
legislation under the Reconstruction Amendments, and how far the 
Court will allow federal intrusion in state affairs. 
 
 
 62. Brief for Appellee Travis County, supra note 12, at 17. 
